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WHOSE SPERM IS IT ANYWAYS IN THE WILD, 
WILD WEST OF THE FERTILITY INDUSTRY? 
Tatiana Elizabeth Posada 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a couple that is unable to conceive a child naturally. 
Luckily, they had the money and resources available to them to 
conceive a child through assisted reproductive technology (ART),1 so 
they decided to start their family through the use of intrauterine 
insemination.2 They selected a sperm bank3 and began the arduous 
process of selecting a sperm donor who fit the desired traits and 
characteristics for their child.4 The sperm bank matched them with an 
anonymous donor, Donor 9623, and assured the couple that the donor 
was “a healthy male with an IQ of 160, a bachelor’s of science in 
                                                                                                                 
 J.D. Candidate, 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you, to Dean Wendy Hensel, 
for all of your invaluable time and guidance on this Note; to the Georgia State Law Review, for 
perfecting this Note; to my friends and peers in law school, for the consistent inspiration and motivation 
you have provided; to Mariya, Sakinah, and Umarah, for being the best mentors I could ask for; to 
Jeffrey and Eric, for helping me finish law school by guiding me through one of the most challenging 
times in my life; and, above all, thank you Sean, for a patience, an understanding, and a love that is not 
of this world. 
 1. Assisted reproductive technology encompasses technology used to address infertility problems. 
See Selecting Your Assisted Reproductive Technology Program, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/assisted-rerproductive-technology-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/7RYX-ZFNM] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 2. Intrauterine insemination is a less invasive and cheaper fertility treatment than in vitro 
fertilization and involves a process of “placing sperm inside the woman’s uterus to facilitate 
fertilization.” Intrauterine Insemination: IUI, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/intrauterine-insemination/ [https://perma.cc/BQ7X-LE6X] (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 3. “A sperm bank, also referred to as a [cryobank], is a facility that collects, freezes, and stores 
human sperm.” Sperm Banking, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/sperm-banking/ [https://perma.cc/9ZWR-26MY] (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2016). 
 4. Sperm bank Xytex allows patients looking for a sperm donor to select certain donor attributes 
they want their donor to have. Sperm Donor Search, XYTEX CRYO INT’L, 
https://www.xytex.com/search-donors [https://perma.cc/69HL-U2MN] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
Patients can select physical characteristics including: hair color, eye color, height, and weight. Id. They 
can also select nonphysical characteristics including: ethnic origin, religion, blood type, and education 
level. Id. Xytex also provides different levels of donors including: Xytex Donors, Xytex Select Donors, 
and Xytex Exclusive Donors. Id. 
1
Posada: Whose Sperm Is It Anyways In The Wild, Wild West Of The Fertility
Published by Reading Room, 2018
848 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
neuroscience, a master’s degree in artificial intelligence, a Ph.D. in 
neuroscience engineering on the way, and no criminal history.”5 
Given this representation of Donor 9623 as the ideal candidate, the 
couple moved forward with the intrauterine insemination procedure 
and successfully conceived a child.6 After starting their new family, 
the couple accidentally found out the identity of Donor 9623, James 
Aggeles,7 and from a simple Internet search, they uncovered the 
shocking truth.8 Instead of their ideal neuroscientist donor, the father 
of their child was “a college dropout with a felony conviction and 
diagnosed schizophrenia.”9 
This is Angela Collins and Margaret Hanson’s story.10 This is Jane 
Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2’s story.11 This is more than fifteen American, 
Canadian, and British families’ stories.12 Angela Collins and 
Margaret Hanson believed they had control over the process to start 
their family and the ability to select the man that would provide half 
of their child’s genetics.13 The sperm bank, Xytex Corporation 
(Xytex), also reassured them that this was the case,14 but in June 
2014, Angela and Margaret received the rude awakening that this 
was indeed not the truth.15 After finding out the true identity of their 
sperm donor, the women began notifying other families who also 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2015). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. “Due to a breach of confidentiality, the identity of BGM 9623 was released by Xytex in 
June 2014 . . . [as] Defendant James Christian Aggeles.” Id. at *7 n.3. 
 8. See Complaint at 18, Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-01453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 17, 2017). Angela Collins and Margaret Hanson discovered information about Aggeles 
through an online search. Id. 
 9. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. Several facts referenced in the Collins and Doe 1 pleadings—
and cited throughout this Note—were confirmed through discovery in the other cases against Xytex 
nationwide and are on file with the author. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *1–2. 
 12. See Christine Hauser, Sperm Donor’s Profile Hid Mental Illness and Crime, Lawsuits Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/world/americas/sperm-donors-profile-hid-
mental-illness-and-crime-lawsuits-say.html [https://perma.cc/7MEL-BEJB]. 
 13. See Sperm Donor Search, supra note 4. Sperm bank Xytex advertises that patients looking for a 
sperm donor have the ability to select certain donor attributes they want their donor to have. Id. 
 14. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. 
 15. See id.; Complaint, supra note 8, at 18. 
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used the same anonymous sperm donor to conceive their children.16 
Donor 9623 has allegedly fathered at least thirty-six children under 
his false identity through the purchase, promotion, and sale of his 
sperm by Xytex.17 
Not only were Angela and Margaret shocked to realize the true 
identity of their sperm donor, but on October 20, 2015, they also 
found out they would not be able to hold Xytex accountable for its 
actions when a Georgia court dismissed their claims in Collins v. 
Xytex Corporation.18 Angela and Margaret brought ten different 
claims against Xytex: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict 
liability in products liability, negligence in products liability, breach 
of express warranty, breach of an implied warranty, battery, 
negligence, unfair business practices, and third party fraud.19 None of 
these claims were prenatal tort claims,20 but a Fulton County 
Superior Court judge dismissed almost every claim, indicating each 
claim was a derivative of the prenatal tort of wrongful birth.21 
According to the court’s reasoning, Georgia does not recognize a 
prenatal tort for wrongful birth; therefore, any claims that are 
derivatives of wrongful birth are also not recognized.22 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Complaint, supra note 8, at 18. 
 17. Id. at 6. 
 18. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *7. 
 19. Id. at *1. 
 20. See Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines prenatal 
torts as “[l]oosely, any of several torts relating to reproduction, such as those giving rise to wrongful-
birth actions, wrongful-life actions, and wrongful-pregnancy actions.” Id. See also Kate Wevers, 
Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 257 (2010). 
“Concurrently with the increasing scope of modern prenatal care, courts have recognized a series of 
prenatal torts that allow parents, and sometimes children, to pursue claims against their medical 
providers for damages flowing from an unwanted birth. These prenatal torts include wrongful birth, 
wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy.” Id. 
 21. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *7 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, strict liability in products liability, negligence in products liability, breach of express 
warranty, breach of an implied warranty, battery, negligence, unfair business practices, and third party 
fraud after finding all claims impermissibly rooted in a concept of wrongful birth). 
 22. Id. at *7. The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint and amended complaint because “Plaintiffs’ 
complaint sets forth ten claims, each with a genesis rooted in the concept of wrongful birth, a claim not 
recognized under Georgia law.” Id. 
3
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Fulton County State Court also dismissed the majority of a separate 
lawsuit against Xytex.23 
Alas, not only have state courts arrived at this analysis and 
conclusion, a federal court in Georgia has also dismissed all claims in 
two separate cases against Xytex for the same reasons.24 In Doe 1 v. 
Xytex Corporation, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia determined the lawsuit against Xytex was a 
wrongful birth case even though the plaintiffs brought eleven causes 
of action, none of which were prenatal tort claims.25 In addition to the 
two lawsuits filed in Georgia state courts, on December 7, 2016, 
there were a total of six federal lawsuits regarding Donor 9623 
pending against Xytex, and these suits were filed across the nation in 
California, Florida, Georgia, and Ohio.26 These cases will 
collectively be referred to as “the Xytex cases” throughout this Note. 
In Georgia, these cases have left families without any ability to hold 
Xytex accountable for its actions and have allowed Xytex to continue 
to operate in the reproductive health care realm however it chooses. 
The purpose of this Note is to assess the need for Georgia to 
reevaluate prenatal torts due to advances in ART procedures, the 
increase in use of this technology,27 and the lack of sperm bank 
regulations, which have now resulted in the problem evidenced by 
the Xytex cases. Part I examines the history behind the creation of 
the three main prenatal torts: wrongful birth, wrongful life, and 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Greg Land, 2 More Suits Over Flawed Sperm Donor Tossed, DAILY REP. (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202781717725/ [https://perma.cc/C28B-S6GF]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-1453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 
17, 2017) (dismissing the eleven claims as derivatives of wrongful birth); Complaint, supra note 8, at 
21–29 (listing the eleven causes of action as follows: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability, 
products liability negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, battery, 
negligence, unfair business practices, specific performance, and false advertising). 
 26. In re Xytex Corp. Sperm Donor Prod. Liab. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1352–53 (J.P.M.L. 
2016). 
 27. Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance–United States, 2010, 
CDC (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6209a1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/B4GH-NZTG] (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). “Since the first U.S. infant conceived with 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) was born in 1981, both the use of advanced technologies to 
overcome infertility and the number of fertility clinics providing ART services have increased steadily 
in the United States.” Id. 
4
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wrongful conception, followed by an examination of the current 
sperm bank regulations. Part II analyzes Georgia’s evaluation of 
prenatal torts, Georgia’s policy considerations when evaluating 
prenatal torts, Georgia’s interpretation of claims against sperm banks, 
and Georgia’s limited sperm bank regulations. Part III examines 
several proposals to remedy this issue, while accounting for 
Georgia’s policy concerns, to ensure the state is protecting its 
citizens’ rights and deterring sperm banks from engaging in 
fraudulent business practices. 
I.   Background 
As evidenced by the Xytex cases, the advancement of ART and the 
lack of sperm bank regulations have resulted in a need to reexamine 
Georgia’s approach to prenatal tort claims and sperm banks. As 
technology advances, it is important for states to adapt to these 
changes to continue protecting fundamental rights surrounding 
decisions to have a child. This section provides a brief introduction to 
prenatal torts generally, an explanation of prenatal torts in Georgia, a 
brief introduction to current sperm bank regulations, and an 
explanation of the convergence of prenatal torts and sperm bank 
regulations. 
A.   Prenatal Torts  
In the 1973 case Roe v. Wade,28 the Supreme Court of the United 
States determined a woman possesses a constitutional right to “make 
an informed decision regarding the procreative options available to 
her.”29 After the Supreme Court held that a woman has a right to 
terminate her pregnancy given temporal limitations,30 the nation 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding the constitutional right to privacy “is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”). 
 29. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 346 (N.H. 1986). 
 30. See id. (referencing Roe v. Wade). The Court found “[d]uring the first trimester of her pregnancy, 
a woman may make this decision as she sees fit, free from State interference.” Id. 
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began to see the development of prenatal torts, to which states have 
responded differently.31 
In general, a tort is “a civil wrong, other than [a] breach of 
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained.”32 There are many 
different types of torts including, but not limited to, intentional torts 
and negligent torts, which include claims like medical malpractice.33 
A prenatal tort is simply a type of tort relating to reproduction34 that 
is usually characterized as a negligence claim or, more specifically, a 
medical malpractice claim.35 The primary prenatal torts include 
wrongful birth actions, wrongful life actions, and wrongful 
conception or wrongful pregnancy actions.36 
1.   Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life 
Generally, wrongful birth is “[a] lawsuit brought by parents against 
a doctor for failing to advise them prospectively about the risks of 
their having a child with birth defects.”37 A wrongful birth claim is 
based on the argument that had the doctor properly advised the 
parents of the child’s risk for birth defects, the parents would have 
opted to not conceive or have an abortion, rather than proceed with 
the pregnancy.38 Wrongful birth generally involves a planned 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See id. at 345. In Justice Batchelder’s opinion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
acknowledged Roe’s recognition of a woman’s right to an abortion as one of “[t]wo developments [that] 
help explain the trend toward judicial acceptance of wrongful birth actions.” Id. 
 32. Tort, supra note 20. 
 33. See id.; Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 34. Tort, supra note 20. 
 35. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D.S.C. 1981) (categorizing wrongful 
birth as within the traditional boundaries of negligence like any medical malpractice action); Burke v. 
Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. 1990) (categorizing a negligently performed sterilization, which is a 
wrongful conception claim, as a medical malpractice claim); Pierce v. Piver, 262 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1980) (categorizing wrongful conception as a medical malpractice claim under the umbrella of 
negligence). 
 36. Tort, supra note 20; see also Caroline Crosby Owings, The Right to Recovery for Emotional 
Distress Arising from a Claim for Wrongful Birth, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 143, 146 (2008). 
 37. Wrongful-Birth Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 38. See PREYESH K. MANIKAL, MEDICAL TORTS IN GEORGIA: A HANDBOOK ON STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAW § 2:13 (2016). Wrongful birth claims involve “the treating physician’s failure to give the 
parents of a potentially impaired child the opportunity to abort the child.” Id. These claims are “brought 
by the parents of an impaired child for a child that would have otherwise been aborted.” Id. 
6
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pregnancy resulting in a child born with a genetic deformity or 
disability.39 Some states recognize wrongful birth actions,40 while 
other states have expressly prohibited the cause of action.41 Where 
wrongful birth is recognized, damages usually include “the 
extraordinary costs associated with raising an unhealthy child until 
the child attains the age of majority, these same costs beyond the age 
of the child’s majority, damages for parental emotional harm, and 
compensation for comprehensive child rearing costs.”42 
A wrongful life claim is essentially the same as a wrongful birth 
claim; however, in a wrongful life claim it is the child or someone on 
behalf of the child, rather than the parent, who is alleging pain and 
suffering.43 Consider the following hypothetical: Dr. A fails to 
prospectively warn patient B about the risk of her having a child born 
with birth defects, so B conceives child C and proceeds with the 
pregnancy. C is then born with birth defects. B (the mother) would 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Julie F. Kowitz, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims for 
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 253 (1995). 
 40. E.g., Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1031 (Ala. 1993) (recognizing a cause of action for 
wrongful birth in Alabama); Arche v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 480 (Kan. 1992) (recognizing 
a cause of action for wrongful birth in Kansas); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829–30 (Va. 1982) 
(recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth in Virginia). 
 41. William C. Duncan, Statutory Responses to “Wrongful Birth” and “Wrongful Life” Actions, 14 
LIFE & LEARNING 3, 3 (2004), http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/Duncan-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5Z8-
KFNS]. Two examples include Idaho and Michigan. Idaho’s statute prohibiting wrongful birth reads as 
follows: “A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, 
based on the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to 
have been born alive but would have been aborted.” Id. at 5. Michigan’s law reads as follows: “A person 
shall not bring a civil action on a wrongful birth claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a 
child or children would not or should not have been born.” Id. at 6. Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah all have similar statutes expressly prohibiting wrongful 
birth. Id. at 5–11. 
 42. Kathleen A. Mahoney, Malpractice Claims Resulting from Negligent Preconception Genetic 
Testing: Do These Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Conception, and Does the 
Categorization Even Matter?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 782, 782 (2006). 
 43. Wrongful-Life Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Wrongful life is a “lawsuit 
brought by or on behalf of a child with birth defects, alleging that but for the doctor-defendant’s 
negligent advice, the parents would not have conceived the child or, if they had, would have aborted the 
fetus to avoid the pain and suffering resulting from the child’s congenital defects.” Id.; see also James 
Bopp, Jr. et al., The “Rights” and “Wrongs” of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential 
Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461, 461–62 (1989). “A wrongful birth action is 
brought by parents seeking damages . . . . The wrongful life action is distinct from the wrongful birth 
action in that a wrongful life claim is brought by or on behalf of a child with disabilities.” Id. 
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bring a wrongful birth claim against Dr. A, while C (the child) would 
bring a wrongful life claim against Dr. A. Both A and C would be 
arguing that, but for Dr. A’s negligent advice, B either would not 
have conceived or would have aborted C, avoiding the pain and 
suffering resulting from the birth defect. While a variety of states 
recognize wrongful birth, only four states recognize wrongful life as 
a valid claim.44 Where wrongful life is recognized, damages usually 
include special damages for costs to the child for the extraordinary 
expenses necessary to treat the birth defect.45 A detailed discussion of 
wrongful life is beyond the scope of this Note because the Xytex 
cases specifically focus on the distinction between wrongful birth and 
wrongful conception. 
2.   Wrongful Conception 
The third and most widely-accepted prenatal tort is wrongful 
conception.46 Generally, a wrongful conception or wrongful 
pregnancy action is “[a] lawsuit brought by a parent for damages 
resulting from a pregnancy following a failed sterilization 
[procedure].”47 Where wrongful conception is recognized, damages 
usually include the mother’s medical expenses and “emotional 
distress damages associated with pregnancy and childbirth,” but most 
courts have declined to expand “such damages to the costs of raising 
the unexpected child to adulthood.”48 Consider the following 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Kowitz, supra note 39, at 255. Courts have upheld the validity of wrongful birth claims almost 
universally, while wrongful life claims have not fared as well. Id. (noting “only four state courts have 
recognized” wrongful life—California, Colorado, New Jersey, and Washington). 
 45. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Empire Cas. Co., 713 P.2d 
384, 394 (Colo. App. 1985); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496–97 (Wash. 1983). 
 46. See Don C. Smith, Jr., Cause of Action Against Physician for Wrongful Conception or Wrongful 
Pregnancy, in 3 CAUSES OF ACTION 83 § 4 (1984, 2017 update). The list of jurisdictions that recognize 
wrongful conception includes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. 
 47. Wrongful-Pregnancy Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 48. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 151 (2005). 
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hypothetical: Dr. X performs a tubal sterilization procedure49 on 
patient Y to prevent future pregnancies, but Y conceives a child 
despite undergoing the procedure. Y would bring a wrongful 
conception claim against Dr. X for performing the procedure 
negligently, resulting in her conception of a child she did not want to 
conceive.50 
B.   Prenatal Torts in Georgia 
Interestingly, several states that expressly prohibit a wrongful birth 
claim recognize wrongful conception as a valid claim.51 Georgia is 
one of those states. The Georgia General Assembly has not expressly 
recognized wrongful birth, and the Supreme Court of Georgia refuses 
to recognize this prenatal tort absent the legislature’s express 
mandate.52 The court, however, has recognized wrongful conception 
as a valid claim that is a subset of malpractice.53 It has used the 
traditional tort analysis to differentiate these two prenatal torts. 
Since prenatal torts are usually considered negligence claims or 
medical malpractice torts, to bring a prenatal tort claim, an individual 
must satisfy the four elements required in the traditional negligence 
                                                                                                                 
 49. In a tubal sterilization procedure, “the fallopian tubes are removed or cut and tied with special 
thread, closed shut with bands or clips, sealed with an electric current, or blocked with scar tissue 
formed by small implants” to prevent pregnancy. Sterilization by Laparoscopy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS 
& GYNECOLOGISTS, http://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Sterilization-by-Laparoscopy 
[https://perma.cc/FS9R-CZSP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
 50. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760–61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (finding a wrongful 
pregnancy claim where a woman sued a physician for negligently performing a tubal sterilization 
procedure consisting of a bilateral tubal ligation, which resulted in an unplanned pregnancy). 
 51. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 41, at 5–7. Some examples include Idaho, Michigan, and 
Minnesota. Idaho specifically distinguishes the legislative prohibition against a cause of action for 
wrongful birth from a cause of action for wrongful conception. Id. at 5. Michigan differentiates a cause 
of action for wrongful birth from a cause of action for wrongful conception by providing limited 
damages for wrongful conception. Id. at 6. Minnesota “specifically allows for malpractice actions based 
on defective contraception or sterilization.” Id. at 7. 
 52. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga. 1990) (finding a 
breakdown in the traditional tort analysis of a wrongful birth claim and, “[i]n spite of the widespread 
recognition and, in fact, because of that recognition and the confusion which has followed in its wake,” 
holding “that ‘wrongful birth’ actions shall not be recognized in Georgia absent a clear mandate for such 
recognition by the legislature”). 
 53. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984). 
9
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analysis.54 The individual must prove: (1) the tortfeasor had a duty to 
the individual; (2) the tortfeasor breached the tortfeasor’s duty to the 
individual; (3) the tortfeasor’s actions caused the individual’s injury; 
and (4) the individual sustained some injury.55 Thus, wrongful birth 
and wrongful conception claims must be able to satisfy these four 
elements to be recognizable claims. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
has determined it is impossible to satisfy all of these elements in a 
wrongful birth claim; therefore, it cannot recognize wrongful birth as 
a valid claim.56 The court has found it is, however, possible to satisfy 
all four traditional tort analysis elements in a wrongful conception 
claim; therefore, it can recognize wrongful conception as a valid 
claim.57 
C.   Applying the Traditional Tort Analysis to Wrongful Birth 
The Supreme Court of Georgia has defined wrongful birth as a 
claim where the parents of an impaired child bring a lawsuit alleging 
“but for the treatment or advice provided by the defendant, the 
parents would have aborted the fetus, thereby preventing the birth of 
the child.”58 In other words, the child would not have been born but 
for the physician’s actions. If the child was aborted, the parents 
would not have had to incur the mental and emotional strains of 
having a disabled child, nor would they have the monetary expenses 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
negligence as a tort that is usually “expressed in terms of the following elements: duty, breach of duty, 
causation, and damages,” and it includes malpractice (professional negligence) as a claim under the 
umbrella of negligence. Id.; see also Hutton Brown et al., Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding 
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 727 (1986) (explaining how the broad 
acceptance of wrongful pregnancy actions (wrongful conception actions) stems from its similarity to 
medical malpractice and the courts’ ability to “identify and consider the traditional tort elements of duty, 
breach, proximate cause, and injury”); Owings, supra note 36, at 148 (explaining how “most 
jurisdictions agree that the cause of action [for wrongful birth] involves, at a minimum, the prima facie 
elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and injury”). 
 55. See Zaldivar v. Prickett, 774 S.E.2d 688, 693–94 (Ga. 2015) (restating the unquestionable rule 
“that liability in tort requires proof that the defendant owed a legal duty, that she breached that duty, and 
that her breach was a proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff”). 
 56. See Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560–61. 
 57. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654. 
 58. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560. 
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associated with the care of a disabled child.59 Further, the child 
would not have had to suffer the mental, emotional, and health issues 
associated with being disabled.60 
The Supreme Court of Georgia first considered wrongful birth in 
Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson.61 In Abelson, the 
plaintiffs’ child was born with Down syndrome, and they brought a 
lawsuit against the physician who provided the postconception 
obstetrical care and treatment.62 The plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf 
of themselves and their daughter alleging the defendants failed to 
properly counsel the plaintiffs about the risks of the pregnancy and 
failed to inform them about the availability of an amniocentesis 
test.63 The plaintiffs sought personal damages for the pregnancy and 
delivery; pain and suffering, mental and emotional anguish, lost 
wages; loss of consortium; and the “reasonable and necessary costs 
of rearing, educating and otherwise providing for [their child] 
including medical expenses.”64 They also sought damages on behalf 
of their child.65 
When applying the traditional tort analysis to the wrongful birth 
claim, the court found that, in general, plaintiffs can satisfy the first 
two elements, duty and breach, in such a cause of action.66 Duty and 
breach can be satisfied because medical practitioners have a duty to 
disclose information regarding genetic deformities to their patients, 
and by not disclosing this information the physician breaches the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id. at 558. Plaintiffs sought damages for “pain and suffering; mental and emotional 
anguish . . . and the ‘reasonable and necessary costs of rearing, educating and otherwise providing for 
[their child] including medical expenses’” due to the genetic disorder. Id. 
 60. See id. Plaintiffs also sought damages on behalf of their daughter for her own pain and suffering, 
as well as the costs to her for her medical expenses associated with the genetic disorder. Id. 
 61. See id. at 559–61 (explaining the court’s precedent recognizing wrongful conception as a valid 
tort and detailing how wrongful birth is different from wrongful conception to explain why the court 
will now choose not to extend the same ruling to wrongful birth). 
 62. Id. at 558. 
 63. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 558. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 560 (noting “[t]he first two prongs of the four pronged traditional tort analysis, those of 
duty and breach, do not present so great a problem” when applying the traditional tort principles to 
wrongful birth). 
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physician’s duty to the patient.67 However, causation and damages 
are the two elements the court determined plaintiffs cannot prove 
when applying the traditional tort analysis to wrongful birth claims.68 
1.   Causation and Damages Preventing the Recognition of 
Wrongful Birth 
First, the court found plaintiffs cannot successfully establish 
causation in a wrongful birth action because the physician’s failure to 
disclose the possibility of genetic deformities cannot be the “but for” 
cause of the child’s genetic deformity;69 a child’s development and 
genetic composition is inherited from the child’s parents, and a 
failure to disclose certain information does not change this fact.70 
However, even if the plaintiffs could satisfy causation, the court 
found the traditional tort analysis would still fail because plaintiffs 
cannot prove damages.71 In a wrongful birth action, plaintiffs are 
claiming the child as their injury, but the Supreme Court of Georgia 
is unwilling to define a child as an injury because of the policy 
implications of such an action.72 The court determined that without 
defining the child as an injury, plaintiffs cannot prove damages in a 
wrongful birth case. Thus, plaintiffs cannot prove the third or fourth 
elements—causation and damages—of the traditional tort analysis 
that the court requires to recognize wrongful birth as a valid claim. 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See id. at 560–61 (noting “a physician has been recognized to have a generalized duty to impart 
relevant information to a patient concerning his or her medical condition”). 
 68. Id. at 561 (noting the traditional tort analysis begins to break down with the injury prong and 
breaks down even further with the causation prong). 
 69. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 561. 
 70. Id. 
The [impairment] is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently 
inflicted by the [defendants]. In addition it is incurable and was incurable 
from the moment of conception. Thus the [defendants’] alleged negligent 
failure to detect it during prenatal examination cannot be considered a 
cause of the condition by analogy to those cases in which the doctor has 
failed to make a timely diagnosis of a curable disease. The child’s 
[impairment] is an inexorable result of conception and birth. 
Id. (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816 (N.Y. 1978) (Watchler, J. dissenting)). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. at 561, 563; see also Campbell v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (N.D. Ga. 
1991) (noting the Supreme Court of Georgia’s refusal “to recognize the life of a child as a legal injury”). 
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2.   The Policy Considerations Preventing the Recognition of 
Wrongful Birth 
Ultimately, the court was unwilling to recognize wrongful birth as 
a legitimate tort claim because of the policy implications associated 
with finding causation and damages in such a claim.73 In Abelson, the 
court explained the policy considerations and long-range 
consequences of recognizing wrongful birth, which are important to 
note since they ultimately resulted in the decision against recognizing 
a cause of action for wrongful birth.74 
First, the court expressed policy concerns regarding causation. 
Finding causation in wrongful birth would increase obstetricians’ 
exposure to liability and thus increase medical malpractice claims 
against obstetricians, which the court believed was bad for the 
public.75 The court also feared that this increased burden on 
obstetricians—trying to determine what information they should 
share with patients—would encourage physicians to recommend an 
abortion where there is any chance of the child having a genetic 
abnormality, simply to avoid liability.76 
Second, the court expressed policy concerns regarding damages. 
Finding damages involves the policy implication of life, and such 
policy issues enter the realm of philosophical questions regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 563. 
 74. See id. at 560 nn.4–5 (discussing the philosophical implications on life and the policy 
implications on obstetricians’ liability exposure that would result from recognizing a cause of action for 
wrongful birth). 
 75. Id. at 560 n.5 (finding “[a] valid concern underlying the legislative curtailment of ‘wrongful 
birth’ actions is the probability that ‘wrongful birth’ claims will give rise to increased medical 
malpractice litigation, with obstetricians’ liability exposure being so broad as to inhibit the practice of 
obstetrics and thereby damage the public good”). The court noted that this policy concern is of particular 
importance to Georgia because in “its 1990 session, the General Assembly [enacted] a statute 
establishing a gubernatorial commission to investigate an ‘obstetrical crisis,’ . . . created by ‘a 
significant decrease in the number of physicians who practice obstetrics,’” which proved to the court the 
need for “a thorough assessment of all of the public policy considerations involved in recognition of 
‘wrongful birth.’” Id. 
 76. Id. at 563 n.9 (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985)) (noting 
“[i]nevitably [recognizing wrongful birth] will place increased pressure upon physicians to take the 
‘safe’ course by recommending abortion” to avoid liability when determining what information is 
important to provide to parents to obtain their informed consent). 
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life, which extends beyond the court’s responsibility.77 There is a 
strong belief that every child’s life is precious, and the Supreme 
Court of Georgia “recoil[s]” from recognizing the birth of a child as 
an injury.78 In general, there are also issues surrounding the policy 
implications on the disabled community, specifically because 
recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth, in essence, places a 
value judgment on living with a disability versus not living at all.79 
This can have negative effects not only on the child’s psyche, but 
also on the disabled community’s psyche.80 
The Supreme Court of Georgia believes these types of policy 
questions are only proper for the legislature to examine as a “forum 
wherein all of the issues, policy considerations and long-range 
consequences involved in recognition of the novel concept of a 
‘wrongful birth’ cause of action can be thoroughly and openly 
debated and ultimately decided.”81 Thus, until the Georgia General 
Assembly decides to recognize wrongful birth as a valid claim, the 
claim will continue to fail in Georgia. 
D.   Applying the Traditional Tort Analysis to Wrongful 
Conception 
Although the Supreme Court of Georgia has recoiled from 
recognizing wrongful birth, it has taken a different approach with 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See id. at 559, 560 n.4 (quoting Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 
1984)) (noting that evaluating the costs of raising a child with an impairment to find damages in a 
wrongful birth claim requires the court to “consider the value which our society places upon human life 
in general and on the lives of children in particular”). The court also noted it is not the place of the court 
to put a valuation on the difference between a life born with an impairment versus having never been 
born at all. See Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560 n.4. 
 78. Id. at 559 (quoting Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 655) (noting the court “instinctively recoil[s] from the 
notion that parents may suffer a compensable injury on the birth of a child”). 
 79. Hensel, supra note 47, at 144 (discussing how “[j]uries in such actions are required to evaluate 
whether a particular disability is so horrible, from the nondisabled perspective, as to make plausible the 
choice of abortion or contraconception by the parent, or non-existence by the disabled child”). 
 80. See generally id. at 171–81; see also Letter from Autistic Self Advocacy Network to Anthony 
Romero, Exec. Director, ACLU, and Susan Herman, President, ACLU (May 25, 2012), 
http://autisticadvocacy.org/2012/05/letter-to-aclu-on-wrongful-birth-and-life-statements/ 
[https://perma.cc/W9SQ-MGTT]. 
 81. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 563. 
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wrongful conception claims. The basis for a wrongful conception 
claim differs from wrongful birth claims because these prenatal torts 
generally involve an unplanned pregnancy typically resulting in a 
healthy child.82 The parents are arguing that but for the physician’s 
negligence, the mother would never have conceived the child, rather 
than arguing the mother would have aborted the child had she known 
of a genetic deformity.83 In other words, the action is for the lost 
opportunity to avoid a pregnancy, rather than the lost opportunity to 
terminate the pregnancy.84 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia views these two prenatal torts differently.85 
1.   Causation and Damages Resulting in the Recognition of 
Wrongful Conception 
The Supreme Court of Georgia first considered wrongful 
conception in Fulton-Dekalb Hospital Authority v. Graves.86 In 
Graves, the plaintiff gave birth to a child with a clubfoot after having 
her physician perform a sterilization procedure specifically to prevent 
childbirth.87 The plaintiff filed suit for negligence and fraudulent 
misrepresentation.88 The court framed the case as one of first 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775 (noting “[w]rongful birth cases tend to involve a planned 
pregnancy, postconception negligence, negligent neonatal testing or care, the birth of an unhealthy child 
and a parental action for the lost opportunity to terminate the pregnancy,” while “[w]rongful conception 
cases, in contrast, typically involve preconception malpractice, an unplanned pregnancy resulting in the 
birth [of] a healthy child, negligence in sterilizations, abortion procedures, pregnancy diagnoses or 
contraception administration and a parental action for the lost opportunity to avoid a pregnancy”). 
 83. See Don C. Smith, Jr., supra note 46, § 2 (noting the focus for injury in a wrongful conception 
claim “is at the point of conception”); see also Lisa A. Podewils, Traditional Tort Principles and 
Wrongful Conception Child-Rearing Damages, 73 B.U. L. REV. 407, 425 n.2 (1993). 
Wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy lawsuits may be distinguished 
from wrongful birth . . . actions. In wrongful birth lawsuits, the parents of 
unhealthy infants seek to recover the cost of caring for the disabled infant. 
Recovery is based on the premise that the parents would have aborted if 
they had known that the child was going to be disabled, or that the child’s 
impairment was caused by the physician’s negligence. 
Id. 
 84. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775. 
 85. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 653–54 (Ga. 1984). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 654. 
 88. Id. 
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impression presenting two questions: “(1) [w]hether Georgia will 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful 
conception and, if so, (2) whether the damages recoverable include 
the cost of rearing and educating the child.”89 
When applying the traditional tort analysis to the wrongful 
conception claim, the court found that, in general, plaintiffs can 
satisfy all four of the required elements in the traditional tort analysis. 
The court recognized wrongful conception as a subset of malpractice 
that does satisfy duty, breach, causation, and damages.90 Duty and 
breach can be satisfied because the medical practitioner has a duty to 
perform a procedure to prevent pregnancy, and the practitioner 
breaches that duty by negligently performing the procedure, which 
results in an unplanned pregnancy.91 Causation is satisfied because 
but for the practitioner’s negligence in performing the procedure, the 
child would never have been conceived.92 Lastly, the damages 
element is satisfied because damages in a wrongful conception claim 
can be tailored to revolve around the procedure itself and the mother 
herself, rather than the child.93 The court chose to limit damages in 
this way by including in the damages calculation the mother’s costs 
for the procedure, for medical complications, and for the delivery, 
while refusing to include the cost of raising the child.94 Including the 
cost of raising the child would require the court to make value 
judgments on life.95 Limiting damages to the procedure, however, 
allowed the court to find damages satisfied when applying the 
traditional tort analysis to wrongful conception without implicating 
policy considerations regarding life.96 Thus, because wrongful 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 653–54. 
 90. Id. at 654 (finding “no reason why an action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception 
should not be recognized in Georgia [because] [s]uch an action is no more than a species of malpractice 
which allows recovery from a tortfeasor in the presence of an injury caused by intentional or negligent 
conduct”). 
 91. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 654–55. 
 95. Id. at 655. 
 96. See id. at 654–55 (ultimately recognizing a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy because 
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conception satisfies the traditional tort analysis, the courts recognizes 
it as a valid claim in Georgia. 
2.   No Policy Considerations Preventing the Recognition of 
Wrongful Conception 
In addition to satisfying all four elements of the traditional tort 
analysis, there were no policy considerations that prevented the 
Supreme Court of Georgia from recognizing wrongful conception as 
a tort. In Graves, the court only provided a limited analysis in its 
opinion recognizing wrongful conception as a valid claim in 
Georgia.97 However, the court did briefly mention a few policy 
concerns that have been argued against recognizing this prenatal tort, 
including the following: “recognition of such a cause of action would 
open the door to fraudulent claims, that the injury is remote from the 
negligence, [and] that recovery would be out of proportion to the 
defendant’s culpability.”98 But, rather than expounding upon any of 
these concerns, the court simply dismissed them by acknowledging 
that these same arguments have been made against countless other 
tort claims, and they have all been “dealt with in the course of 
traditional tort litigation.”99 The only policy concern the court took 
the time to consider was the implication of including the costs of 
raising the child in the damages calculation for a wrongful 
conception claim.100 It ultimately rejected this request because “given 
the values cherished by our society, a parent cannot be said to have 
suffered an injury in the birth of a child,” and including the costs of 
raising the child in the damages calculation is synonymous with 
                                                                                                                 
damages limited to “expenses for the unsuccessful medical procedure which led to conception or 
pregnancy, for pain and suffering, medical complications, costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of 
consortium” are consistent with damages under other medical malpractice claims and do not deviate 
from traditional tort remedies). 
 97. Compare Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 653–56 (recognizing wrongful conception as a valid cause of 
action in a three-page opinion), with Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 
557, 557–67 (Ga. 1990) (declining to recognize wrongful birth as a valid cause of action in a ten-page 
opinion). 
 98. Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 655–56. 
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considering the child an injury.101 The court ultimately concluded 
that all of these considerations do not prevent the recognition of 
wrongful conception as a valid cause of action, so long as damages 
are limited to not include the costs of raising the child.102 
E.   The Convergence of Prenatal Torts and Sperm Bank 
Regulations 
As ART rapidly advances,103 the law governing this technology 
continues to lag.104 Advances in technology, such as genetic testing 
and in vitro fertilization, have only recently pushed some states to 
consider sperm bank regulation.105 The Xytex cases illustrate the 
convergence of prenatal torts and sperm bank regulation. There have 
been few cases against sperm banks for negligence and medical 
malpractice.106 The Xytex cases, however, depict how sperm banks 
may be named as defendants in various lawsuits, but the absence of 
statutory guidelines107—combined with judicial interpretations of 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 654–55 (finding “no reason why an action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful 
conception should not be recognized in Georgia” but limiting damages to not include the cost of rearing 
the child). 
 103. See In Vitro Maturation: IVM, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/ivm-in-vitro-maturation/ [https://perma.cc/8GFW-3PM2] (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2016). Advances in technology have led to a variety of infertility treatments, such as 
zygote intrafallopian transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, 
donor insemination, and in vitro maturation. Id. 
 104. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2015). 
Because the science that brought us the wonders (and attendant moral and 
legal challenges) of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and 
embryo transplantation has developed much faster than the laws we rely on 
to regulate such procedures (and the business models that have sprung up 
around them), discussion of the issues raised by this litigation is 
complicated and careful use of terminology is critical. 
Id. 
 105. See Daniel J. Penofsky, Liability of Sperm Banks, in 50 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 1 (1994, updated 
2017) (discussing how “[o]ver the past decade, remarkable advances have been made in the fields of 
cryogenics and molecular biology” leading to the proliferation of sperm banks, yet “there is an 
astonishing absence of state and federal laws regulating sperm banks and artificial insemination 
practitioners” and less than half of the states have enacted regulations). 
 106. Amy L. Fracassini, The Regulation of Sperm Banks and Fertility Doctors: A Cry for 
Prophylactic Measures, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 275, 284 (1992). 
 107. Id. at 279 (noting sperm bank facilities are vulnerable to lawsuits for various claims regarding 
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prenatal torts—creates a gap in which sperm banks largely operate 
invisibly, and are untouchable, in the reproductive health care realm. 
The United States is known as the “Wild, Wild West”108 of the 
fertility industry because, for the most part, sperm banks across the 
nation currently operate unregulated.109 The federal government’s 
sperm bank regulations are very limited in scope.110 The United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only requires sperm 
banks to specifically screen for a limited number of diseases 
including: human immunodeficiency virus, Hepatitis B virus, 
Hepatitis C virus, human transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, 
treponema pallidum, communicable disease risks associated with 
xenotransplantation, viable leukocyte-rich cells, and infection due to 
limited communicable diseases of the genitourinary tract.111 Sperm 
                                                                                                                 
wrongful insemination, transmission of diseases, and breach of privacy rights or duties of confidentiality 
and “state legislatures must address the legal duties of those performing inseminations and delineate the 
responsibilities of sperm storage facilities in order to effectively respond to reproductive trends in 
modern society”). 
 108. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access to Cross Border 
Fertility Care in the United States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 361 (2012) (noting the United 
States’ “well-documented if not completely deserved reputation as the Wild West of fertility treatment 
because of its comparative lack of strong regulation of the multi-billion dollar fertility industry”); 
Michael Ollove, States Not Eager to Regulate Fertility Industry, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 18, 
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-to-
regulate-fertility-industry [https://perma.cc/DGY6-SAWW] (noting the federal and state governments in 
the United States have done little to oversee the ART industry compared to many other industrialized 
nations, which has led to the common description by many critics of the United States as “the Wild 
West of the fertility industry”); Debora L. Spar, Fertility Industry Is a Wild West, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/13/making-laws-about-making-babies/fertility-
industry-is-a-wild-west [https://perma.cc/9CB6-DLJ7] (noting the United States lives in a “Wild West 
of procreative possibility”). 
 109. Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation Is Not the 
Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 379 (2009) (noting the limited federal sperm donation 
regulations and few, limited-scope state laws and regulations); Tamar Lewin, Sperm Banks Accused of 
Losing Samples and Lying About Donors, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/sperm-banks-accused-of-losing-samples-and-lying-about-
donors.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4J98-226A] (reporting on how “sperm banks are lightly regulated”). 
 110. See What You Should Know–Reproductive Tissue Donation, FDA (Nov. 5, 2010), 
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232876.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VUH5-JLM3] (noting Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) sperm bank regulations 
are limited to requiring facilities to register with the FDA, requiring facilities to review a donor’s risk 
factors for relevant communicable disease, and requiring facilities actually test donors for a limited 
number of infectious diseases); Pi, supra note 109, at 379 (noting “there is currently little federal 
regulation of sperm donation”). 
 111. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75 (2006); What You Should Know–Reproductive Tissue Donation, supra note 
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banks are not required by the federal government to actually test 
sperm donor applicants for anything outside of this list of diseases.112 
These regulations also do not require or impose on sperm banks any 
standard of care or any duty to ART patients.113 
There are some private, professional organizations, such as the 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), the American 
Association of Tissue Banks (AATB), and the American Fertility 
Society (AFS) that attempt to address the problem of limited federal 
regulations.114 The ASRM, AATB, and AFS issue more specific 
guidelines for sperm banks, but sperm banks are not required to be 
members of these organizations or comply with these guidelines.115 
Thus, some states have created their own regulations for sperm banks 
by requiring special state licensure and onsite inspections,116 but 
Georgia has not implemented any special regulations specifically for 
sperm banks outside of facility requirements.117 Georgia’s 
Department of Community Health (the Department) only requires 
sperm banks to have a general clinical laboratory license.118 The 
Department’s requirements for the license include staff, record 
keeping, collection, and storage requirements, as well as specific 
education and experience requirements for the director of the lab and 
                                                                                                                 
110. 
 112. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75; What You Should Know–Reproductive Tissue Donation, supra note 
110. 
 113. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75. 
 114. John K. Critser, Current Status of Semen Banking in the USA, 13 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 55, 55 
(1998), http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/suppl_2/55.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCY-XKP7] 
(noting “[g]uidelines for anonymous donor sperm banking practices have been established by the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine and standards have been established by the American 
Association of Tissue Banks (AATB)”); Pi, supra note 109, at 387–88 (noting “[p]rofessional 
organizations attempt to govern important aspects of the sperm donation process by publishing 
standards and guidelines aimed at adequate screening, control over children per donor and monitoring of 
a donor’s genetic and medical history”). 
 115. Pi, supra note 109, at 387 (noting sperm banks can choose to associate with these professional 
organizations or not, so these guidelines are nonbinding suggestions). 
 116. Id. at 384 (noting some states have passed regulations requiring supervision by licensed 
physicians, testing, licensing, and registration). 
 117. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 111-8-10-.17 (2016) (regulating sperm banks as a clinical laboratory 
under healthcare facility regulations). 
 118. See id. 
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certain employees within the lab.119 It also includes requirements for 
documentation and three basic requirements for collecting donor 
history.120 Similar to federal regulations, however, these regulations 
also do not require or impose on sperm banks any standard of care or 
any duty to ART patients.121 
Thus, between federal and state regulations, sperm banks are 
operating in the reproductive health care realm by providing services 
for ART procedures, but they are not being held to the same 
standards as the physicians they work alongside. Medical 
professionals (physicians) are generally held to a higher standard of 
care than nonprofessionals (sperm banks in this case) in negligence 
actions.122 Under the law, physicians owe certain duties to their 
patients that sperm banks do not owe to the same patients.123 
Physicians have “a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is 
expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to 
which [the practitioner] belongs, acting in the same or similar 
circumstances.”124 Without similar laws and regulations governing 
sperm banks, it is difficult to determine what, if any, duty or standard 
of care sperm banks must provide in their relationship with patients 
using their services.125 This is important to note because even if 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. (requiring that staff be “trained in the most current methods of cryobanking,” records contain 
“a donor release and a complete history,” special identification codes be used in the storage process, 
sperm be processed within one hour of collection, and directors and supervisors meet minimum training 
and experience requirements). 
 120. Id. (requiring clinics document certain factors such as the criteria for assessing fertilization; 
insemination schedules; the volume and quality of sperm used for insemination; requiring donor 
histories to include an interview; examination of personal, physical, sexual, and genetic histories; and an 
“examination of semen to ensure viability and motility, freedom from infection and/or foreign cells and 
freezing survival capabilities”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Fracassini, supra note 106, at 290. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (quoting DOUGLAS K CUSINE, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES: A LEGAL PROSPECTIVE 
104 (1988)). 
 125. Id. Fracassini states the following: 
A standard of care is difficult to define in the field of cryobanking because it is a new medical field that 
lacks established guidelines and regulatory oversight. The only consistent source of standards are 
guidelines promulgated by the AFS and the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB). The 
problem inherent in the use of these guidelines is that although adherence to these standards is strongly 
suggested, it remains a voluntary decision. 
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plaintiffs could validly bring a negligence action against a sperm 
bank in Georgia, this reality—sperm banks seemingly having no 
heightened professional duty to ART patients—may greatly impact 
the court’s ability to find a duty and a breach, which would 
ultimately determine the outcome of the lawsuit. 
In Georgia, the lack of professional care and duty required of 
sperm banks, combined with the courts’ prenatal torts analyses, has 
created a gap in the law. The Xytex cases indicate families are unable 
to hold sperm banks accountable for the health services they provide. 
This combination essentially leaves no mechanism in place to 
adequately protect Georgia citizens from negligent or fraudulent 
business practices nor has the combination provided any mechanism 
to hold the sperm banks accountable for the reproductive services 
they offer to the public.  
II.   Analysis 
As the use of ART increases,126 states must find a way to protect 
their citizens while deterring sperm banks from operating under 
negligent or fraudulent business practices. This issue is particularly 
new for Georgia, but the Xytex cases demonstrate the need and 
importance of reevaluating prenatal torts in the state.127 Part II of this 
Note first compares Georgia’s refusal to recognize wrongful birth 
claims with its acceptance of wrongful conception claims and then 
analyzes the claims brought against Xytex in the Xytex cases, as well 
as the lack of sperm bank regulations in Georgia. 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 126. Intrauterine Insemination, supra note 2. 
 127. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2015). In Collins, the court mentions the time is ripe for a cause of action to be recognized that would 
allow plaintiffs to pursue negligence claims against Xytex. Id. 
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A.   Comparing the Court’s Considerations for Wrongful 
Conception in Graves with Wrongful Birth in Abelson 
It is important to compare the Supreme Court of Georgia’s 
reasoning for rejecting wrongful birth to its reasoning for accepting 
wrongful conception to better understand where the Xytex cases fall 
within prenatal torts. Six years after recognizing a cause of action for 
wrongful conception in Graves, the court rejected the recognition of 
wrongful birth in Abelson.128 However, the court wrote a much more 
in-depth analysis regarding the policy considerations in Abelson than 
it did in Graves.129 Given the amount of time the court devoted to 
discussing the policy implications of recognizing wrongful birth in 
Abelson, unlike wrongful conception in Graves, it seems the court 
does not believe wrongful conception implicates the extensive policy 
concerns that wrongful birth implicates and, vice versa, that wrongful 
birth implicates more than the general policy concerns associated 
with traditional torts that normally can be addressed in traditional tort 
litigation.130 The policy considerations these prenatal torts implicate 
include concerns regarding exposure to liability, recommendations 
for abortions, the impact on the disabled community, and placing 
valuations on the life of a child. 
The court’s first policy consideration that prevented recognition of 
wrongful birth but did not prevent the recognition of wrongful 
conception is exposure to liability. Recognizing a cause of action for 
wrongful conception does not raise judicial concerns regarding 
increasing exposure to liability and medical malpractice claims 
because wrongful conception focuses on an actual procedure the 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 557 (Ga. 1990); Fulton-
DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 653 (Ga. 1984). 
 129. Compare Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 557–67 (declining to recognize wrongful birth as a valid cause 
of action in a ten-page opinion), with Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 653–56 (recognizing wrongful conception 
as a valid cause of action in a three-page opinion). 
 130. Compare Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560 nn.4–5, 563 n.9 (taking time to discuss the philosophical 
implications on life and the policy implications on obstetricians’ liability exposure that would result 
from recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth), with Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654 (discounting 
policy concerns regarding liability exposure, remote injury, and out of proportion damages in two 
sentences). 
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medical practitioner conducts rather than what information the 
practitioner discloses to the parents.131 In other words, wrongful 
conception does not hold the practitioner accountable for anything 
more than the procedure for which the practitioner should be held 
accountable.132 The court expressed concern that wrongful birth, on 
other hand, would create uncertainty surrounding what the 
practitioner is required to disclose to the patient, increasing liability 
exposure because practitioners could be sued for not disclosing 
certain information they did not know they were required to 
disclose.133 
The court’s second policy consideration that prevented recognition 
of wrongful birth but did not prevent the recognition of wrongful 
conception follows from concerns regarding exposure liability: 
abortion recommendations. Because wrongful conception does not 
deal with disclosing information to patients and increasing liability, 
the court is not concerned that practitioners would suggest the patient 
get an abortion in order to protect themselves from liability, which is 
a concern that exists for wrongful birth.134 The court’s third policy 
consideration that prevented recognition of wrongful birth but did not 
prevent the recognition of wrongful conception is the impact on the 
disabled community. Generally, because wrongful conception cases 
usually involve healthy children, not children with disabilities like in 
wrongful birth cases, there is also no concern that recognizing the 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654. The court notes damages that include the cost of the 
“unsuccessful medical procedure which led to conception or pregnancy, for pain and suffering, medical 
complications, costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium” are consistent with malpractice 
cases and traditional tort remedies. Id. These damages focus on the procedure rather than what the 
physician tells the patient. Id. 
 132. See id. (noting “[s]uch an action is no more than a species of malpractice which allows recovery 
from a tortfeasor in the presence of an injury caused by intentional or negligent conduct”). 
 133. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560 n.5, 563 n.9 (noting concerns that the uncertainty surrounding what 
information must be disclosed to the patient to receive proper informed consent would cause an increase 
of liability exposure and result in practitioners advising patients to undergo an abortion in order to avoid 
liability). 
 134. Compare id. at 560 (defining wrongful birth as a claim for negligent treatment or advice, and 
advice does implicate what the physician verbally discloses or suggests to the patient), with Graves, 314 
S.E.2d at 654 (defining wrongful conception as a claim for negligently performing a sterilization or 
abortion, and the focus on performance does not implicate what the physician verbally discloses or 
suggest to the patient). 
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cause of action would impact the disabled community in a negative 
manner.135 Finally, unlike wrongful birth, the court does not think 
policy concerns surrounding life and children are an issue in 
wrongful conception claims because the focus is not the abortion of a 
child; the focus is the failure of a procedure, and limited damages 
excluding the costs of raising the child ensure the court does not 
cross this line with calculations involving life or recognizing the 
child as a burden.136 
B.   Applying the Court’s Considerations to the Xytex Cases 
The Xytex cases are the first of their kind to implicate these 
prenatal torts in an unexpected and detrimental way. These decisions 
suggest it will be extremely difficult for parents to successfully bring 
any claims—tort, contract, products liability, or otherwise—against a 
sperm bank in Georgia because of how the state and federal courts 
have analyzed such claims.137 Because the Xytex cases include 
multiple state and federal cases that involve the same facts, the same 
outcome, and similar arguments described in the Introduction, this 
section will consider the judicial analysis in only two of these 
cases—Collins v. Xytex and Doe 1 v. Xytex—to provide an example 
of how the courts at the state and federal levels have used a 
derivative analysis in these cases. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See Don C. Smith, Jr., supra note 46 (defining a wrongful birth action as one “brought by the 
parents of a severely unhealthy child”); Kimberly D. Wilcoxon, Statutory Remedies for Judicial Torts: 
The Need for Wrongful Birth Legislation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2001) (defining wrongful 
conception as actions where “there is usually no claim that the baby has birth defects, but merely that 
the baby was born”). 
 136. Compare Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 561–63 (finding a cause of action for wrongful birth is 
unrecognizable because it necessarily deviates from traditional tort remedies by implicating questions of 
abortion and valuations on life), with Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654 (recognizing a cause of action for 
wrongful conception that allows recovery for costs associated with the medical procedure because this 
does not deviate from traditional tort remedies by implicating questions of abortion or the value of life). 
 137. See Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *7 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 
20, 2015). The court dismissed tort, contract, and products liability claims by analyzing them all as 
derivatives of a cause of action for wrongful birth, so whether there are any other claims that could be 
brought that would not be susceptible to this derivative analysis is difficult to conceive. Id. 
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1.   Georgia’s Analysis of Claims as Derivatives of Wrongful 
Birth 
a.   Collins v. Xytex 
Although the plaintiffs in Collins did not bring any prenatal tort 
claims against Xytex,138 the Fulton County Superior Court’s decision 
to analyze each claim as a derivative of a wrongful birth claim 
prevented the women from bringing any tort, contract, or products 
liability claims against Xytex.139 The trial court primarily focused on 
two aspects of the case: damages and the fact that the case involved a 
planned pregnancy.140 First, the superior court determined that no 
matter what tort or contract claims the plaintiff brings, all of these 
claims are derivatives of a prenatal tort because the damages involve 
a child.141 If the damages involve the birth of a child, this is the 
signature of a prenatal tort no matter what the claims are disguised 
as, so the claims must be treated as such given all of the social issues 
and policy implications associated with evaluating the birth of a child 
as a damage.142 Second, because the superior court determined these 
claims were derivatives of a prenatal tort, the court needed to 
determine which prenatal tort the claims were a derivate of: wrongful 
birth or wrongful conception. The superior court acknowledged that 
the plaintiffs were not claiming that but for Xytex they would have 
aborted the child, but nevertheless, the fact that this was a planned 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. at *1. The Collins’ claims included fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability in 
products liability, negligence in products liability, breach of express warranty, breach of an implied 
warranty, battery, negligence, and unfair business practices. Id. 
 139. Id. at *7 (dismissing all tort, contracts, and products liability claims as impermissibly “rooted in 
the concept of wrongful birth”). 
 140. See id. at *2 (reasoning the Collins’ claims were more similar to wrongful birth, even though 
abortion was never an option since the sperm selection process is considered preconception, but because 
the pregnancy was planned and concluded in an unwanted result—a child with genetic traits that the 
family did not want—this aligns more with wrongful birth, although not perfectly). 
 141. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (noting “simple nomenclature cannot transform one type of 
tort into another. Others have tried this approach in this context—and failed”). 
 142. Id. at *2 (finding “despite their alternative characterizations of Defendants’ allegedly tortious 
actions, Plaintiffs at base are challenging the purported negligence that resulted in a wanted conception 
with unwanted results. This claim most closely (though by no means perfectly) fits a claim for wrongful 
birth—and so is not allowed”). 
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pregnancy greatly impacted the court’s decision to classify the claims 
as derivatives of wrongful birth claims.143 The court decided that, 
because this situation involved a planned pregnancy and not an 
unplanned pregnancy, the facts aligned more with a wrongful birth 
claim rather than a wrongful conception claim.144 Accordingly, the 
superior court dismissed all of the claims because Georgia does not 
recognize wrongful birth as a cause of action.145 
b.   Doe 1 v. Xytex 
Although the plaintiffs in Doe 1 did not bring any prenatal tort 
claims against Xytex, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia’s decision to analyze each claim as a 
derivative of a wrongful birth claim similarly prevented the plaintiffs 
from being able to bring any tort, contract, fraud, or products liability 
claims against Xytex.146 In Doe 1, however, the plaintiffs did attempt 
to persuade the court that their case was one for wrongful conception 
rather than wrongful birth, but the court was not satisfied with their 
argument.147 The plaintiffs argued that “the functional differences 
between [wrongful birth and wrongful conception] are (1) the timing 
of the tort (i.e., pre- or post-conception), and (2) whether a 
defendant’s actions directly or indirectly caused the injury.”148 Thus, 
because the wrong here occurred prior to conception and directly 
caused harm, the case is more similar to a wrongful conception case. 
But, the district court chose to focus on damages to evaluate the 
plaintiffs’ argument. The court stated, “The true difference between 
[wrongful birth and wrongful conception] is the measure of 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at *2 (noting Georgia defines wrongful conception as a situation involving a sterilization 
procedure and an unplanned pregnancy, and this case does not present such a claim). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *7. 
 146. See Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-1453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 
17, 2017) (dismissing the eleven claims as derivatives of wrongful birth); Complaint, supra note 8, at 
21–29 (listing the eleven causes of action as follows: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability, 
products liability negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, battery, 
negligence, unfair business practices, specific performance, and false advertising). 
 147. Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *2. 
 148. Id. 
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damages,” not the timing of the tort and whether the injury was 
direct, as suggested by the plaintiffs, and the court disfavors wrongful 
birth claims specifically “because they require the court to decide 
between the value of a life with disabilities and the value of no life at 
all.”149 With this in mind, the court determined no matter how the 
plaintiffs attempted to describe the situation, avoiding the use of the 
donor’s sperm would not mean the plaintiffs’ children would be 
healthier.150 It would mean the child would not exist, which is the 
essence of a wrongful birth claim.151 Thus, the district court 
dismissed all of the claims because Georgia does not recognize 
wrongful birth.152 
2.   Why the Xytex Cases Are Different from Abelson and Graves 
The issue presented in the Xytex cases is different than what 
Georgia courts have experienced with prenatal torts thus far because 
the cases do not fit squarely into one of the above-described prenatal 
tort claims. Wrongful birth cases involve planned pregnancies, 
postconception negligence, indirect causation, and unhealthy 
children, whereas wrongful conception cases involve unplanned 
pregnancies, preconception negligence, direct causation, and healthy 
children.153 The Xytex cases, however, involve a planned pregnancy 
(a signature of wrongful birth), preconception negligence (a signature 
of wrongful conception), and otherwise healthy children (a signature 
of wrongful conception). Therefore, the Xytex cases involve 
elements of both wrongful birth and wrongful conception. The 
courts, however, have not considered all of these elements. In 
Collins, the superior court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that this 
was a planned pregnancy.154 Although a planned pregnancy is more 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id. at *3. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775. 
 154. See Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 
20, 2015). 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss3/8
2018] WILD WEST OF THE FERTILITY INDUSTRY 875 
consistent with the court’s understanding of wrongful birth claims 
than wrongful conception claims, this should not be the sole 
determining factor in analyzing these claims as derivatives of 
wrongful birth. In Doe 1, the district court placed a heavy emphasis 
on the damages being the children’s nonexistence.155 While defining 
a child’s life as a damage is more consistent with the court’s 
understanding of wrongful birth claims than with wrongful 
conception claims, again, this should not be the sole determining 
factor in analyzing these claims as derivatives of wrongful birth. 
If Georgia courts are going to analyze claims against a sperm bank 
as derivatives of prenatal torts, all of the above signature elements 
should be considered, not just one element, because they all implicate 
the Supreme Court of Georgia’s initial considerations that resulted in 
the Abelson and Graves decisions. Thus, in order to determine which 
prenatal tort the Xytex cases are most similar to, the following four 
factors must be considered: (1) the timing of the tort relative to 
conception, (2) causation, (3) the health of the child, and (4) 
damages. When accounting for all of these factors, it is clear the 
Xytex cases align with wrongful conception more than with wrongful 
birth because they involve the following: (1) preconception conduct, 
(2) a direct cause, (3) a healthy child, and (4) damages that can be 
limited to not include the cost of the child. 
a.   Timing: Preconception Versus Postconception 
The first element that must be considered is the timing of the tort 
relative to conception: does the case involve preconception or 
postconception conduct? The plaintiffs in these cases are focused on 
the negligence that occurred preconception, not postconception, 
which aligns more with a claim for wrongful conception. The 
plaintiffs are not arguing that, but for Xytex, they would have aborted 
the child. They are arguing that, but for Xytex, they would not have 
conceived the child to begin with.156 In other words, the basis of the 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *3. 
 156. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. Plaintiffs’ contention in Collins is “had they known the true 
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argument is not that, had Xytex disclosed true information about the 
donor, the plaintiffs would have opted for an abortion. Instead, the 
basis of the argument is that, had Xytex taken appropriate steps to 
ensure the donor was indeed the person the company was advertising, 
Xytex would have learned the donor was not a match before the 
intrauterine insemination procedure. This would have resulted in the 
plaintiffs not proceeding with the donor selection and ART procedure 
and, hence, never reaching conception. Thus, Xytex’s negligence 
occurred preconception. Although the Supreme Court of Georgia did 
not explicitly discuss the differences between preconception and 
postconception in Abelson and Graves, this factor is important 
because it implicates the other considerations in Abelson and Graves, 
which impacted the Xytex decisions. 
When the plaintiffs in Doe 1 attempted to focus on the fact that 
this was a preconception issue, the district court equated their 
argument—that the plaintiffs would have never used the sperm to 
conceive—with the fact that this essentially means the children 
would not exist, which makes the case a wrongful birth case.157 This 
conclusion, however, is a fallacy because anyone could arrive at the 
same conclusion for a true wrongful conception case: if the physician 
conducted the sterilization procedure correctly, this essentially means 
the child would not exist. The court’s analysis completely disregards 
the fact that it can limit damages. In Graves, it was precisely because 
wrongful conception can also be viewed as defining the child as a 
damage that the Supreme Court of Georgia specifically limited 
damages so that it could recognize wrongful conception as a prenatal 
tort that fits within the bounds of the traditional tort analysis.158 The 
court decided to limit damages in order to focus on the procedure and 
decided not to include damages for raising the child so that it could 
recognize a claim without implicating questions regarding the child’s 
                                                                                                                 
characteristics of BGM 9623 when they should have—that is, at the time Xytex rendered its services—
A.C. would not have been conceived.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at 
*2. Plaintiffs’ contention in Doe 1 is that the case is one for wrongful conception. Id. 
 157. Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *3. 
 158. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654–55 (Ga. 1984). 
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existence. Thus, the fact that the children would not exist, on its own, 
neither negates the reality that the issue at hand occurred 
preconception, nor does it automatically make the case one for 
wrongful birth. The other elements must also be analyzed to 
determine which prenatal tort these cases most align with. 
b.   Causation: Direct Causation Versus Indirect Causation 
The second element that must be considered is causation: does the 
case involve direct causation or indirect causation? Courts can find 
direct causation in the Xytex cases, which aligns more with a claim 
for wrongful conception. In Abelson, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
determined causation cannot be met in a wrongful birth claim 
because a physician cannot be the cause of a genetic condition 
inherited by the child.159 The court expressed concerns that finding 
such attenuated, indirect causation would increase medical 
malpractice claims and liability exposure.160 The Xytex plaintiffs, 
however, were not simply trying to hold a person accountable for an 
inherited genetic condition because the children in those cases were 
healthy.161 Instead, the plaintiffs were trying to hold a company 
accountable for its direct actions that constituted a significant part of 
the ART procedures the plaintiffs received. 
Recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims against Xytex would not 
increase exposure to liability due to attenuated causation because the 
claims’ focus is on Xytex’s actual sperm donation procedures. The 
plaintiffs argued Xytex had an obligation to not participate in 
fraudulent business practices and to match the plaintiffs with sperm 
donors who met specific qualifications like the company advertised. 
Xytex breached that obligation by not thoroughly investigating their 
donors—as Xytex claims it does—falsely advertising specific donor 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 561 (Ga. 1990). 
 160. Id. at 560 n.5. 
 161. See Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *4 (noting the child’s current healthy state, “Plaintiffs do not 
allege a present injury but rather an apprehension of a future injury to A.C.—that he may in time 
become schizophrenic”); Complaint, supra note 8, at 30 (including a medical monitoring fund in the 
prayer for relief to monitor the child’s health). 
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qualifications, encouraging the applicant to lie about his credentials 
in order to get his sperm to sell, and matching the plaintiffs with a 
donor who was not who Xytex said he was.162 Xytex’s breach 
resulted in the plaintiffs selecting one specific donor for their ART 
procedures. Had Xytex not breached its legal obligations, the families 
would never have been matched with this donor for their ART 
procedures. In other words, Xytex’s actions directly resulted in the 
selection and pairing of the donor with the plaintiffs. This causation 
is direct, not attenuated, because Xytex’s business involves providing 
an essential component of ART procedures; without sperm, an 
intrauterine procedure cannot be conducted.163 Thus, the plaintiffs are 
not trying to hold the sperm bank accountable for anything more than 
its part in an ART procedure for which the sperm bank should be 
held accountable. Further, recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims against 
Xytex would not increase medical malpractice claims because the 
plaintiffs are suing a company for its services, not the physician 
conducting the medical procedure. 
Finally, the court was also concerned that, because finding 
causation would increase liability exposure, it would also incentivize 
practitioners to recommend abortions in order to protect themselves 
against liability.164 In the Xytex cases, however, recognizing the 
plaintiffs’ claims against Xytex would not incentivize practitioners to 
recommend abortions because these cases involve the sperm bank 
providing services for the procedure, not the practitioner performing 
the ART procedure. Further, at this point in the process—sperm 
donor selection—the child has not even been conceived yet, so 
abortion is not an option. All of these factors mirror a claim for 
wrongful conception. 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Complaint, supra note 8, at 6–8, 10–11, 13, 29. 
 163. Intrauterine Insemination: IUI, supra note 2. 
 164. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 563 n.9. 
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c.   Health: A Healthy Child Versus an Unhealthy Child 
The third element that must be considered is the health of the 
child: is the child healthy or unhealthy? The children in the Xytex 
cases are currently healthy, which aligns more with wrongful 
conception. As mentioned above, these children were born healthy, 
not with any serious genetic disability, and a healthy child is 
indicative of a wrongful conception claim, not a wrongful birth 
claim.165 This factor is important because it implicates one of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia’s major policy considerations in Abelson 
and Graves: the policy implications surrounding life. Doe 1 
summarized this concern by stating, “Wrongful birth claims are 
disfavored because they require the court to decide between the value 
of a life with disabilities and the value of no life at all.”166 
In the Xytex cases, however, recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims 
against Xytex would not impact the disabled community negatively 
because the children are currently healthy. It can be argued that 
because the families sought funds to monitor the children’s health for 
the development of an impairment,167 this would still negatively 
impact the disabled community because the court would be placing a 
value on the costs associated with caring for a child that might 
develop an impairment. It is possible, however, for the courts to 
avoid this issue altogether. If the courts chose to analyze the claims 
as wrongful conception claims, the families would not be allowed to 
seek such damages because wrongful conception damages exclude 
future costs of raising the child.168 Allowing such future costs is what 
sends a message to the disabled community that a disabled life is 
somehow less valuable than no life at all. If the families’ damages 
only included those allowed in a wrongful conception claim—costs 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775. 
 166. Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-01453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 
2017). 
 167. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *4 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2015); Complaint, supra note 8, at 30. 
 168. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1984) (finding damages in 
a wrongful conception claim do not include the costs of raising the child). 
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for the procedure, medical complications, and delivery—the family 
would not be receiving any costs associating the child’s possible 
development of a disability with the damage. Families would only be 
receiving costs for the services they were sold that turned out not to 
be what they contracted for. Thus, the courts would not be sending a 
message to the disabled community that the disabled life is somehow 
less valuable. This ties into the fourth element: damages. 
d.   Damages: Including the Child Versus Excluding the Child 
The final element that must be considered is damages: does a 
finding of damages require including the cost of the child as a 
damage? Damages in the Xytex cases can be limited to not include 
the cost of the child, which aligns more with wrongful conception. 
As mentioned above, damages implicate one of the Supreme Court of 
Georgia’s major policy considerations in Abelson and Graves: the 
policy implications surrounding life. All of the courts in these cases 
have referenced the Supreme Court of Georgia’s refusal to recognize 
that a child’s life amounts to a legal injury because of the policy 
implications.169 However, these policy concerns are not a problem in 
the Xytex cases because the issue in these cases is not the abortion of 
an unhealthy child; the main issue is a company’s failure to provide 
the services the plaintiffs agreed to. The harm in a wrongful 
conception case is the impact on the woman’s right to plan the size of 
her family, not the child.170 Similarly, here, the harm is not the child. 
The harm is the impact on women’s right to make an informed 
decision regarding the procreative options available to them, which 
included ART procedures that required the selection of a sperm 
donor and insemination with the sperm of a person to whom the 
women have consented. This aligns with the basis of a wrongful 
conception claim. 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See id.; Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 559; Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at * 2; Doe 1, 2017 WL 
1036484, at *3. 
 170. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654 (noting that in Roe v. Wade the United States Supreme Court 
“recognized that a woman has the right to plan the size of her family,” and choosing to recognize a 
claim for wrongful conception regardless of the practical considerations raised). 
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Although the plaintiffs did request costs for monitoring the 
children for the development of any mental impairment as they get 
older, this was only one line item in the damages sought and is one 
that the court can limit.171 The Supreme Court of Georgia’s 
recognition of wrongful conception in Graves provides the perfect 
example of how courts can recognize claims via limited damages 
because the court chose to recognize the plaintiffs’ claims even 
though they asked for future child-rearing costs. By limiting damages 
to exclude the costs of raising a child, wrongful conception ensures 
the court does not cross a philosophical line with calculations 
involving life or recognizing the child as a burden. The same 
argument and method can be applied in the Xytex cases. 
Overall, the Xytex cases align more closely with wrongful 
conception because they do not implicate all of the policy concerns 
that prevented the Supreme Court of Georgia from recognizing 
wrongful birth. The underlying focus of wrongful conception is a 
procedure that results in an outcome that is not consistent with what 
the patient consented to.172 Although the Xytex cases do not involve 
a sterilization procedure or an abortion procedure, they involve 
intrauterine insemination procedures that were not consistent with 
what the women consented to in preparation for the procedure.173 
C.   Georgia’s Lack of Regulation 
Whether the Xytex claims are analyzed as derivatives of any 
prenatal tort, however, requires returning to the issue of sperm bank 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Complaint, supra note 8, at 30. Plaintiffs sought damages for pain and suffering, financial losses, 
attorneys’ fees, costs of the lawsuit, a medical monitoring fund, injunctive relief, and punitive damages. 
Id. 
 172. See Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775 (noting wrongful conception can encompass more 
procedures than sterilization and abortion, such as contraception administration and preconception 
genetic testing). 
 173. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. In Collins, Plaintiffs consented to a sperm donor with specific 
qualities for their intrauterine insemination. Id. Defendants reassured Plaintiffs that they were getting 
sperm with those specific qualities, but, in fact, Plaintiffs were not. Id.; see also Complaint, supra note 
8, at 8–10. Similarly, in Doe 1, Plaintiffs consented to a sperm donor with specific qualities for their 
artificial insemination, and Defendants reassured Plaintiffs that they were getting sperm with those 
specific qualities, but, in fact, Plaintiffs were not. Id. 
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regulation. If contract, tort, and products liability claims are all 
analyzed as derivatives of a prenatal tort, plaintiffs would need to 
satisfy the four elements of the traditional tort analysis to succeed in 
any of their claims. As mentioned in Part I, the first element that 
plaintiffs must satisfy is duty. The Supreme Court of Georgia has 
found a duty in wrongful birth and wrongful conception claims 
because medical practitioners have a duty to disclose information 
regarding genetic deformities to their patients, and medical 
practitioners have a duty to perform the medical procedure agreed 
to.174 Sperm banks, however, do not have the same duties as medical 
practitioners because they are not regulated in the same manner. 
As discussed in Part I, federal sperm bank regulations are limited 
to requiring sperm banks to conduct screening for a limited number 
of diseases, leaving it up to the states to implement regulations 
requiring more stringent sperm bank standards, duties, and methods 
of donor screening. While Georgia requires sperm banks to have a 
clinical laboratory license, the regulations governing these licenses 
only set standards for the operation of the lab, the education of the 
employees in the lab, and documentation processes.175 This 
regulation does not set any additional sperm bank standards or donor 
screening requirements, nor does the regulation create any 
heightened or professional duty, relationship, or standard of care 
between a sperm bank and the ART patients.176 It is important to note 
that whether a plaintiff can prove a sperm bank has certain duties to 
the patient undergoing the ART procedure is yet to be seen and might 
be hindered by this lack of regulation. Even if courts find a duty 
exists, it still might be difficult to prove the sperm bank breached its 
duty during the sperm bank’s donor screening, selection, and 
matching processes because the sperm bank’s standard of care when 
conducting these processes will likely be that which is considered 
reasonable within the industry. Thus, courts could find that Xytex is 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560–61. 
 175. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 111-8-10.17 (2016). 
 176. Id. 
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acting reasonably in accordance with industry standards because the 
industry basically has no standards. 
III.   Proposal 
Prenatal torts are extremely complex because of the many policy 
concerns involved with these claims; however, precisely because of 
their complexity, this area of the law cannot be ignored as ART 
continues to advance. The Xytex cases exemplify just how important 
it is for the law to advance with technology. The Xytex cases allege 
that Xytex not only negligently paired the plaintiffs with a donor who 
was not what Xytex advertised, but also intentionally suggested to 
the donor that he falsify his application according to what sperm sells 
best on the market.177 Although such business practices should be 
considered unacceptable, it is no surprise that Xytex might engage in 
these practices considering the company can presumably charge 
higher rates for sperm donors with higher qualifications.178 
Xytex’s attempt to transfer the cases filed against the company in 
other states to Georgia—its principal place of business and home to 
its headquarters—and its attempt to consolidate all the federal cases 
in Georgia179 indicate the company may purposefully be hiding from 
the law in a state that lacks the pistols for a duel. Georgia should no 
longer harbor such outlaws by allowing them to take advantage of 
state laws at the expense of individual rights, not even out of a desire 
to limit the regulation of businesses. Solving this issue while 
accounting for the complex public policy concerns, however, will 
take a multi-branch approach. Thus, this Note proposes a 
combination of (1) the Georgia judiciary’s acceptance of certain 
claims in the Xytex cases and an expansion of the wrongful 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Complaint, supra note 8, at 10–11. 
 178. Pricing, XYTEX CRYO INT’L, https://www.xytex.com/patient-information/pricing/ 
[https://perma.cc/JL6N-CJCT] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) (charging more expensive rates for patients 
to obtain premium access to the company’s enhanced donor profiles to select their sperm donor). 
 179. See Doe v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2016 WL 3902577, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 
2016) (Xytex moving to transfer the case to the Southern District of Georgia); In re Xytex Corp. Sperm 
Donor Prod. Liab. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1352–53 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (Xytex moving to centralize 
pretrial proceedings in this litigation in the Northern District of Georgia). 
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conception claim to include more than sterilization procedures, and 
(2) the Georgia General Assembly’s implementation of more 
stringent state laws governing sperm banks. 
A.   Accepting Certain Claims and Expanding Wrongful 
Conception 
First, in order to compensate families and to hold companies like 
Xytex accountable for their procedures, Georgia courts should 
change their analysis of claims against sperm banks. Instead of 
analyzing these claims as derivatives of wrongful birth, the court 
should take the following dual approach: (1) analyze the plaintiff’s 
claims as claims that already have limited damages built into them 
rather than as derivative claims, and (2) analyze only the remaining 
claims that do not already have limited damages as derivatives of 
wrongful conception. If the courts adopted this dual approach, it 
would give the Xytex families the opportunity to bring all of their 
claims against Xytex. 
First, as discussed in Parts I and II, the Georgia courts’ main 
reason for differentiating between wrongful birth and wrongful 
conception is the issue of damages because of the policy implications 
that arise from recognizing a child as a damage. Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia recognizes wrongful conception specifically 
because of the limited damages. Some of the claims the Xytex parties 
brought, however, already have limited damages built into the claim. 
For example, in Doe 1, the plaintiffs brought a cause of action for 
unfair business practices under the Georgia Fair Business Act 
(GFBA).180 Under the GFBA, individuals have a private right to sue 
a company for unfair business practices to recover injunctive relieve, 
general damages, and exemplary damages where the violation was 
intentional.181 Because the GFBA does not allow plaintiffs to recover 
special damages, the damages would already be limited to the direct 
and necessary damages—pain and suffering, emotional distress, and 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Complaint, supra note 8, at 27. 
 181. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399 (2018). 
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the cost of the services.182 Such claims already limit the damages in 
the same manner as wrongful conception, so courts could analyze 
these claims as-is rather than as a derivative of a prenatal tort because 
the damages will not implicate political questions regarding life. 
Other claims the plaintiffs brought, such as the products liability 
and tort claims, do not have limited damages.183 Thus, these claims 
could potentially invoke damages that classify the child as an injury. 
Rather than just outright dismissing these claims, however, the court 
could analyze these claims as wrongful conception derivatives in 
order to achieve their limited damages goals. The Georgia judiciary 
can accomplish this by expanding wrongful conception similar to 
what Minnesota and North Carolina courts have done. 
1.   Adopting the Minnesota and North Carolina Wrongful 
Conception Approach 
Given that the Xytex cases align more with wrongful conception 
than wrongful birth, the Georgia courts should expand wrongful 
conception to encompass preconception negligence in assisted 
reproductive procedures and could do so without disrupting 
Georgia’s policy concerns. In Minnesota and North Carolina, a claim 
similarly consisting of both wrongful birth and wrongful conception 
characteristics shows that courts can classify these situations as 
derivatives of wrongful conception instead of wrongful birth. 
Minnesota and North Carolina are similar to Georgia because these 
states also recognize a prenatal tort for wrongful conception while 
refusing to recognize a prenatal tort for wrongful birth.184 Both of 
these states considered the same policy concerns as Georgia in 
deciding not to recognize wrongful birth. The Minnesota legislature 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (differentiating between general 
damages as those damages that are so reasonably expected they do not require proof and special 
damages as particular or extraordinary damages that must be proven). 
 183. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-2 (2018) (defining the damages allowed in tort actions under Georgia law, 
which include both general damages and special damages). 
 184. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 784–785 (analyzing Minnesota and North Carolina as states that do 
not recognize wrongful birth but do recognize a broad interpretation of wrongful conception). 
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completely banned wrongful birth presumably because the legislature 
believes it is never appropriate to consider the birth of a child as a 
damage.185 The North Carolina Supreme Court came to the same 
conclusion as Georgia: given all of the policy implications and 
consequences of recognizing such an action, it is the responsibility of 
the state legislature to determine whether such an action should 
exist.186 
The wrongful conception prenatal tort in Minnesota and North 
Carolina, however, encompasses more than just sterilization and 
abortion procedures.187 It also includes pregnancy diagnoses, 
contraceptive administration, and negligent genetic testing.188 In 
recent years, several states have addressed negligent preconception 
genetic testing, another prenatal claim that has arisen due to advances 
in genetic testing technology.189 This prenatal claim is also defined 
by a combination of wrongful birth and wrongful conception 
characteristics. It typically involves a planned pregnancy resulting in 
the birth of an unhealthy child (i.e., wrongful birth), but it also 
involves negligence that occurs preconception (i.e., wrongful 
conception).190 Some states have been analyzing this claim as a 
derivative of wrongful birth because the situation involves a planned 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See Duncan, supra note 41, at 6–7 (analyzing Minnesota within a list of other states that 
specifically deny claims for wrongful birth by statute). 
 186. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985). 
The General Assembly of North Carolina, as a coordinate and equal branch 
of our government, is better suited than this Court to address the issues 
raised by this case. Only that body can provide an appropriate forum for a 
full and open debate of all of the issues arising from the related theories of 
“wrongful” birth and “wrongful” life. Unlike courts of law, the General 
Assembly can address all of the issues at one time and do so without being 
required to attempt to squeeze its results into the mold of conventional tort 
concepts which clearly do not fit. 
Id. 
 187. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 784 (noting “[t]hese states have expanded wrongful conception from 
the contexts of negligent sterilizations, abortions, pregnancy diagnoses, or contraceptive administration, 
to circumstances involving negligent genetic testing”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 775–76. 
 190. Id. (noting “[b]ecause this strain of parental claims factually implicates aspects associated with 
both wrongful birth and wrongful conception, courts have varied in their approaches to this specific 
prenatal issue”). 
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pregnancy and an unhealthy child.191 Minnesota and North Carolina, 
however, have instead expanded the wrongful conception claim to 
encompass these situations because negligent preconception genetic 
testing involves negligence that occurs before conception.192 Even 
though these states do not recognize wrongful birth, the state courts 
have been able to expand wrongful conception while balancing 
policy concerns to adapt to technological advances. The Xytex cases 
(which involve preconception negligence, direct liability, and healthy 
children) involve more characteristics of wrongful conception than 
negligent preconception genetic testing cases (which only involve 
preconception negligence). Thus, the Xytex cases arguably align 
more with wrongful conception than negligent preconception genetic 
testing does, which favors the expansion of wrongful conception in 
Georgia. 
The Georgia courts could follow Minnesota and North Carolina by 
focusing on the fact that the negligent act occurred preconception, 
and it involves direct liability, an otherwise healthy child, and 
damages that courts can limit to the cost of the sperm bank’s 
services, the ART procedure, or both. Had the sperm bank acted 
reasonably in its donor screening process, the plaintiffs would never 
have conceived their children because the donor did not match the 
plaintiffs’ application preferences. Thus, the donor would not have 
been selected for their ART procedure. In other words, but for 
Xytex’s negligence in processing sperm donors and matching them 
with applications, the children would never have been conceived. 
Minnesota and North Carolina are examples of how state courts can 
expand the wrongful conception analysis without impacting the 
policy concerns that the courts and legislature took into consideration 
when deciding not to recognize wrongful birth. 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 785 (noting “[t]hough negligent preconception genetic testing appears to involve aspects 
associated with the wrongful birth action, the courts in these two states label these claims as wrongful 
conception”). 
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2.   Accounting for Previous Policy Concerns 
This dual approach would account for the policy concerns that the 
Supreme Court of Georgia considered in Abelson and Graves: the 
policy implications regarding life, increasing medical malpractice 
lawsuits, and increasing liability. First, for those claims that already 
have limited damages, plaintiffs would not be able to recover 
damages for the cost of raising the child, so the claims would not 
implicate valuations of life or send a negative message regarding life 
to the disabled community. 
Second, regardless of what damages are normally allowed in the 
remaining claims, the damages would automatically be limited to 
wrongful conception damages because the court would analyze the 
claims as derivatives of wrongful conception. Thus, the damages 
would be limited to expenses for the “medical procedure which led to 
conception or pregnancy, for pain and suffering, medical 
complications, costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of 
consortium.”193 This protects against crossing the line into wrongful 
birth territory where damages include a valuation on life and 
negatively impact the disabled community. Although families will 
not obtain all of the costs they originally wanted (e.g., the costs of 
monitoring the child’s health), this will at least provide an avenue to 
receive some costs associated with their ART procedures and hold 
companies like Xytex accountable for their actions. 
Third, since the lawsuits are against the sperm banks, not the 
physicians, there is no concern that this would result in an increase in 
medical malpractice lawsuits. Lastly, while this approach would 
increase liability for sperm banks, sperm banks should be at risk for 
liability because they are currently participating in ART procedures 
in a fairly unregulated manner and without liability risks. 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984). 
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3.   Accounting for New Policy Concerns 
Although the original policy concerns would be accounted for, 
new policy concerns might arise. First, allowing plaintiffs to bring 
products liability claims against sperm banks might present a moral 
and ethical dilemma by considering sperm a “product.” Under a 
products liability analysis, several theories of liability require a 
showing of a defective product.194 Finding an individual’s sperm 
“defective” because of a mental illness, a disability, a disease, or a 
criminal history might negatively impact several communities that 
are already stigmatized (e.g., the mentally ill community, the 
disabled community, and the ex-convict community). However, if the 
courts apply the method described above, they can avoid implicating 
such moral and ethical questions. Products liability claims would 
likely fall under the category of claims that do not already have 
limited damages, so the court would analyze the claims as derivatives 
of wrongful conception. In conducting the traditional wrongful 
conception analysis there is no discussion regarding whether a 
product is defective, so the court would not need to engage in a 
question of whether an individual’s sperm is defective. The focus 
would remain on the sperm bank’s screening and matching processes 
and the harm to the woman’s right to make an informed decision 
regarding the procreative options available to her. 
Another policy concern is whether allowing plaintiffs to bring 
these claims against sperm banks would open the floodgates of 
litigation. Sperm banks allow individuals to select sperm donors with 
very specific qualities ranging from eye color to education level. 
Allowing plaintiffs to bring suit against sperm banks might open the 
door to lawsuits for discrepancies over minor donor characteristics 
such as eye color. However, in anonymous donor cases like the 
Xytex cases, the families usually never find out the name of the 
donor. Thus, unless a company makes a mistake, families that use 
anonymous sperm donors likely will not find out if any discrepancies 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Product Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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between the donor and the donor’s application actually exist. But, 
families would need to learn about a discrepancy in order to file a 
lawsuit over the discrepancy, so an essential component required for 
opening the floodgates of litigation is unlikely to occur. Further, 
arguments distinguishing between breaches of material donor 
characteristics that actually cause harm to the woman’s right to make 
an informed decision regarding the procreative options available to 
her versus breaches of immaterial donor characteristics that do not 
cause such harm can be dealt with in the course of traditional 
litigation. 
B.   Georgia Regulations 
While the judiciary should alter its approach to the Xytex cases, 
this change might not be enough to solve the problem. As mentioned 
in Part II, finding duty and breach in these cases might be difficult 
without any laws in place that establish the sperm bank’s duty to 
ART patients. This could impact the court’s analysis of any claims 
that are derivatives of wrongful conception by making it difficult for 
the court to find duty and breach. Further, sperm banks offer 
anonymous sperm donations, such as the donations in the Xytex 
cases. The only reason the plaintiffs discovered the truth about their 
donor is because Xytex accidentally notified them of the donor’s true 
identity, and from there, the plaintiffs conducted their own 
investigation. Thus, the only reason the plaintiffs were even able to 
bring suits against Xytex in the first place was all because of an 
accident. This begs the question: how many other families have been 
impacted by Xytex’s misrepresentations and negligence? While 
changing the judicial analysis would allow the courts to ensure 
accountability and compensation in the Xytex cases, that same 
accountability and compensation would not be afforded to any other 
families that Xytex paired with false donor applications unbeknownst 
to the families. If the state only changes the judicial analysis, Xytex 
could continue their unacceptable practices because they can simply 
hide behind anonymous donors, gambling on the reality that no other 
suits will be brought against them because anonymous donors usually 
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remain anonymous. In other words, the chance of any other families 
finding out that their donor was not who Xytex advertised them to be 
is very limited. Therefore, to protect all families using sperm 
donations, it is important for the Georgia General Assembly to 
affirmatively establish explicit duties and standards that sperm banks 
are legally required to follow. 
The Georgia General Assembly should adopt laws that both 
expand a sperm bank’s duties during the donor screening process and 
establish a duty owed to ART patients. To expand a sperm bank’s 
duties during the donor screening process, the legislature should pass 
a law that requires sperm banks to develop reasonable measures to 
ensure a sperm donor is not lying on the application to become a 
sperm donor. Such measures could include conducting background 
checks and employment verification for all donor applicants, as well 
as conducting multiple in-person interviews of donor applicants. The 
legislature should also establish procedures in the event that, at some 
point after accepting the donor applicant as a sperm donor, the sperm 
bank discovers a major discrepancy with a material fact used to 
advertise and promote the donor (e.g., the donor does not have 
certain illnesses, diseases, or a felony record). Such procedures could 
include requirements for sperm banks to immediately update the 
sperm donor’s profile with the relevant information and immediately 
notify sperm recipients who were matched or are about to be matched 
with that sperm donor. 
To establish a duty owed to the ART patients, the AFS and AATB 
have suggested legislatures pass laws that hold sperm banks to 
standards similar to those imposed on doctors.195 Because sperms 
banks are operating in a field required for advanced reproductive 
medical procedures, the legislature should pass a law that establishes 
sperm banks owe a heightened duty to ART patients, which includes 
a professional standard of care, rather than the reasonable standard of 
care found within the industry. The legislature could also use this 
opportunity to include in the law a private cause of action against 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Fracassini, supra note 106, at 302–04. 
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sperm banks that breach the specified duty, for which damages shall 
exclude any costs associated with raising or caring for the child. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is known as the Wild, Wild West of the fertility 
industry for a reason, and as sperm banks continue to take advantage 
of the lack of federal regulations, the pressure will fall on the states to 
remedy the situation. The combination of an inability to pursue 
adequate legal claims against a sperm bank and no regulations 
implementing adequate sperm bank standards essentially leaves no 
mechanism in place to protect individual rights. No one is holding the 
sperm banks accountable for the reproductive procedures they 
facilitate. By shifting the analysis to a wrongful conception analysis 
and creating sperm banks regulations, Georgia has an opportunity to 
not only remedy the situation, but to lead the nation in reigning in the 
Wild, Wild West. 
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